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IMPLICATIONS OF A REVITALIZED 28 U.S.C. § 1400(B): 
IDENTIFYING THE “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE 
OF BUSINESS” FOR PATENT VENUE IN THE INTERNET AGE 
By Steven Pepe and Samuel Brenner* 
I.          INTRODUCTION  
On May 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands 
LLC,1 a case that likely will alter significantly how and where patent 
infringement cases can be brought in U.S. district courts.  The specific 
issue in TC Heartland was whether venue in patent actions is 
controlled solely by the special patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b), or whether venue in patent actions is also informed by the 
general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.2  Since the Federal Circuit’s 
1990 decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,3 
patent holders have been permitted to rely on the general venue statute 
and, as a result, have been permitted to bring patent infringement 
actions in any district in which the court has personal jurisdiction over 
the defendants.4  This has resulted in the development of a number of 
patent-friendly jurisdictions and, accordingly, what observers view as 
a form of blatant forum shopping by patent holders when bringing 
 
*Steven Pepe is a partner in the Intellectual Property Litigation practice group at Ropes & Gray 
LLP.  He received his J.D. from Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, and his 
L.L.M. in Intellectual Property from the George Washington University Law School. Samuel 
Brenner is a senior associate in the Intellectual Property Litigation practice group at Ropes & 
Gray LLP.  He received his J.D. from The University of Michigan Law School and his Ph.D. 
in History from Brown University.  The authors would like to thank Darlena Subashi and 
Vladimir Semendyai for research assistance. 
1 TC Heartland LLC v, Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, No. 16-341, —S. Ct. — (2017). 
2 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland LLC, 2016 WL 4983136, at *1 (U.S. 2016) 
(No. 16-341).  
3 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
4 See id. at 1583. 
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patent cases.5  In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court unanimously6 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s holding in VE Holding,7 thus making it 
clear that venue in patent cases is governed solely by the  restrictive 
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which states: “Any civil action for 
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the 
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”8 
Now that TC Heartland has prevailed, the sort of blatant forum 
shopping criticized by observers will likely be minimized. 
Even before oral argument, a great deal had already been 
written on the merits of TC Heartland’s argument, both by 
commentators and interested parties.9  Indeed, in addition to the merits 
brief filed by TC Heartland, by February 6, 2017, nineteen separate 
groups of amici had already filed briefs.10  To most of these 
 
5 See, e.g., Brief for the State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7-15, 
TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341) [hereinafter Brief for the State of 
Texas et al.]. 
6 Justice Gorsuch, who joined the Supreme Court after oral argument, took no part in the 
consideration or decision of the case.  TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 10. 
7 See, e.g., TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 1 (“We therefore hold that a domestic corporation 
‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.”); id. at 7-
8. 
8 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999) (emphasis added). 
9 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue 
Statute, 66 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract = 2914091; Dennis 
Crouch, TC Heartland: Statutory Interpretation, Fairness, and E.D. Texas, PATENTLYO (Feb. 
7, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/ 2017/02/heartland-statutory-interpretation-
fairness.html; Rebecca Kaufman & Abby Parsons, TC Heartland v. Kraft: Awaiting a 2017 
Supreme Court Decision with Potentially Significant Implications for Patent Litigation, 
JDSUPRA (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/tc-heartland-v-kraft-awaiting-a-
2017-39309/; Megan M. La Belle & Paul R. Gugliuzza, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: TC 
Heartland and Patent Venue, PATENTLYO (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/federal-circuit-heartland.html; Michael Risch, Guest 
Post: TC Heartland and Statutory Interpretation, PATENTLYO (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/12/heartland-statutory-interpretation.html. 
10 Among those are briefs filed by 61 law and economics professors (drafted by Mark Lemley 
at Stanford Law School); the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago; General 
Electric; the Electronic Frontier Foundation; the American Bar Association; and the states of 
Texas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 
generally Brief of the A.B.A. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC, 
137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16–341); Brief of the Electronic Frontier Found. & Pub. 
Knowledge as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 
(2016) (No. 16–341); Brief of Gen. Elec. Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, TC 
Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief of the Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n 
of Chicago as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Petitioner or Respondent, TC Heartland 
LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief of Amici Curiae 61 Professors of Law and 
2
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commentators, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would accept at 
least part of TC Heartland’s argument and issue a decision that 
significantly constrained where patent holders can sue alleged patent 
infringers.11  While there was some dispute after oral argument 
regarding which way the Court was leaning,12 in the end the Court, as 
expected, decisively reversed the Federal Circuit.13 This decision 
likely represents a sea change in the law—in one fell swoop, the Court 
overruled almost three decades of patent litigation precedent and 
practice, dating back to VE Holding.  In the process, the Court 
necessarily made it much more difficult for patent holders to sue in the 
Eastern District of Texas, a district that is perceived by many as being 
patentee-friendly14 and that was the location of 44% of all patent cases 
filed in 2015.15 The fact that patent holders gravitate to the Eastern 
District of Texas comes as no surprise — as compared to other 
districts, the Eastern District of Texas generally has seen higher 
median damages awards, lower transfer rates of patent cases, lower 
stay rates pending Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) proceedings, 
lower rates of summary judgment of non-infringement and invalidity, 
and lower rates of dismissing cases based on non-patentable subject 
matter than have many other districts.16   
Unless Congress steps in to maintain the status quo in a new 
patent venue statute, this decision by the Supreme Court overruling VE 
Holding obviously has significant implications for patent 
litigators.  One of the effects of this decision is to raise once again what 
had been a key and thorny question implicated by the special patent 
 
Econ. in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief 
for the State of Texas et al., supra note 5, at 7-15. 
11 Steven Pollinger & Yusuf Rangwala, Much More Than East Texas Is At Stake In TC 
Heartland, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.law360.com/ articles/889785/ 
much-more-than-east-texas-is-at-stake-in-tc-heartland-; Gene  Quinn, Supreme Court Agrees 
to Hear Patent Venue Case Filled with Patent Reform Implications, IPWATCHDOG         (Dec. 
14, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/14/supreme-court-patent-venue-case-patent-
reform-implications/id=75751/.  
12 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, “TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Oral Arguments,” Apr. 2, 
2017, www.patentlyo.com, at https://patentlyo.com/ patent/2017/04/heartland-kraft-
arguments.html; Daniel Fisher, “Supreme Court Seems Unenthusiastic About Eliminating 
Patent-Troll Venue,” Forbes, Mar. 28, 2017. 
13 See, e.g., TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 7-8. 
14 See, e.g., Brief for the State of Texas et al., supra note 5, at 7-15. 
15 Lisa Schuchman, Eastern Texas Had an ‘Astounding’ Number of Patent Cases in 2015, 
CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.corpcounsel.com /id=1202746460787/Eastern-
Texas-Had-an-Astounding-Number-of-Patent-Cases-in-2015. 
16 Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation 
in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5, 16-18 (2017). 
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venue statute: what, exactly, is meant by a “regular and established 
place of business” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)?17  As 
one district court noted in 1986 (just four years before VE Holding), 
“[t]he case law development of this issue encompasses a wide variety 
of opinions as to the type and extent of contacts that signify a regular 
and established place of business.  Indeed, the courts have reached 
opposite conclusions in substantially similar cases.”18  And as another 
court observed, “[i]t is true that no reliable test has been devised by 
which a court can determine whether or not a foreign corporation 
maintains a regular and established place of business within any certain 
District.”19  Instead, the courts are required to analyze the factual 
pattern of each individual case.20  In fact, before the Federal Circuit in 
VE Holding made this question irrelevant, there was extensive case 
law, both at the district court level and at the various circuits, 
addressing this exact question and exhaustively considering individual 
fact patterns.21  One leading treatise suggested that many of the close 
cases generally fall into four regularly recurring patterns: the 
“Traveling Salesman Cases,” the “Sales Office Cases,” the 
“Independent Sales Representative Cases,” and the “Parent and 
Subsidiary Corporations—Separate Divisions” Cases.”22  Courts 
deciding what constituted a regular and established place of business 
routinely applied the law to these recurring fact patterns, analogized to 
similar cases to reach decisions, or considered factors that had proven 
relevant in cases arising in this context.23  Now that the Court in its TC 
Heartland decision has overruled VE Holding, these cases are 
presumably once again both relevant and possibly binding, after a 
thirty-year hiatus.   
 
17 Pollinger & Rangwala, supra note 11. 
18 OMI Int’l Corp. v. MacDermid, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (M.D.N.C. 1986); see also 
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, What Constitutes “Regular and Established Place of Business” 
Within Meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) Fixing Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 12 
A.L.R. Fed. 502, § 9[a] (1972) (“The decision in any case depends upon the factual pattern of 
that particular case, and whether a defendant’s activities within a district are sufficient to 
justify its subjection to suit in that district is a question of fact.”).  
19 Up-Right, Inc. v. Aluminum Safety Prod., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 742, 744 (D. Minn. 1958). 
20 See generally id. 
21 See, e.g., Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 1[a] (“This annotation collects the cases which have 
construed and applied to particular factual situations the words ‘a regular and established place 
of business’ as appearing in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) . . . .”). 
22 See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02[2] (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). 
23 See, e.g., Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 1382, 1387 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(“The facts relevant to venue in the present case are very close to the facts in Shelton.”). 
4
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But in today’s high-tech world, there could be problems with 
dusting off and relying upon long-dormant law regarding what 
constitutes a “regular and established place of business.”  Because the 
world has changed in significant ways since the 1980s, not to mention 
the 1920s, doing so might lead to improper results.  As the Supreme 
Court recently observed in the Fourth Amendment context in ruling 
that a search incident to arrest cannot include warrantless searches of 
the data on smartphones, such modern devices “are based on 
technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago . . . .”24  It 
seems likely that, outside of the realm of science fiction, the business 
people of the 1920s-1980s could not have imagined the technology-
driven world of Amazon, eBay, and Uber, and the power of a personal 
computer and smartphone to reach nearly any business in the United 
States with a web presence with just a few keystrokes.25  Given these 
differences, and that business in the Internet age is simply conducted 
today in a different way than it was in the pre-VE Holding period, it is 
not clear how much of the pre-VE Holding law on what constitutes a 
regular and established place of business should remain good law with 
respect to fact patterns that were not contemplated by these cases.  Put 
another way: by trying to apply law that is at least three decades old to 
very different real-world circumstances, courts will likely be reading 
far more into 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) than Congress ever conceived of or 
intended.  And doing so without some better signal from Congress 
would inappropriately broaden the explicitly limited language of § 
1400(b).26 
 
24 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
25 Cf. Kerr v. Port Huron Sulphite & Paper Co., 157 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.N.J. 1957) (noting, 
in 1957, that the law of personal jurisdiction was required to change in light of “the growth in 
the last quarter of a century in both the size and complexity of modern American business and 
its methods . . . .”).  
26 The challenges posed by applying older law to vastly changed technological circumstances 
have been recognized by both commentators and courts in non-patent contexts. See, e.g., The 
Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, The Internet and the Constitution: A Selective 
Retrospective, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 135, 138 (2014) (noting that lawyers and scholars 
report “the story of a system overwhelmed: by the rapid pace of technological changes; by 
whole areas of doctrine, like the First Amendment, that are an uncomfortable fit with the 
Internet; by legal regimes, like jurisdiction, that haven’t yet adapted to technologies that don’t 
play by old rules or respect physical boundaries.”).  Many courts have attempted to address 
these challenges by developing balancing tests, or otherwise seeking to integrate 
circumstances such as internet usage into more traditional legal concepts.  For example, in the 
context of personal jurisdiction, many courts have adopted the Zippo sliding-scale test, under 
which “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly 
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the 
Internet.” Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Penn. 
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In this Article, we focus on the state of the law regarding what 
constituted a regular and established place of business before VE 
Holding made it irrelevant, and on how that law might apply in the 
Internet Age.  We argue that, while many pre-VE Holding cases 
regarding what constitutes regular and established place of business 
can apply in the Internet Age (especially where courts are looking at 
traditional ways of doing business that have not changed in response 
to technology), courts should be leery of attempting to analogize in all 
cases between the standard ways of doing business in the 1940s-1980s 
and the hyper-connected, Internet-driven ways of doing business of 
today.  In part by using four recurring fact patterns of cases identified 
by an established patent law treatise, Chisum on Patents, and in part 
by examining what factors courts considered in “regular and 
established place of business” cases, we examine which aspects of pre-
VE Holding business could best lend themselves to reasoning-by-
analogy, and what sorts of cases that might arise today more readily 
fall outside any of those fact patterns, or even outside the general 
governing principles that can be distilled from the earlier cases.   
We conclude that, while it can be tempting for courts to look to 
what has been said in the law previously, in deciding what constitutes 
a regular and established place of business in the age of Google, 
Facebook, Uber, eBay, and Amazon, courts may in some 
circumstances be better served by refusing to analogize new 
technologies to the fact patterns in past decisions, and even refusing to 
expand existing general § 1400(b) principles to novel technological 
circumstances, and instead reading § 1400(b) narrowly until and unless 
Congress indicates how and whether patent venue should be expanded 
to accommodate what is truly a different world than Congress could 
have imagined.  And, finally, we conclude that, regardless of what 
happened in TC Heartland itself, and regardless of whether the specific 
test for what constitutes a regular and established place of business 
once again becomes a critical question for courts, this case study 
demonstrates a broader principle:  that, even in a legal system 
generally governed by precedent, relying on cases that are many 
 
1997).  Nonetheless, other courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have urged caution in using this 
sort of test, suggesting that it improperly extends prior case law. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 
539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that there was no personal jurisdiction in 
California where a California plaintiff purchased a car from a Wisconsin seller over eBay and 
noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has, in the past, sounded a note of caution that traditional 
jurisdictional analyses are not upended simply because a case involves technological 
developments that make it easier for parties to reach across state lines.”). 
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decades old in a rapidly changing world presents challenges and 
concerns that courts should at least consider before doing so.   
II.        THE VENUE STATUTES: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(C) AND 1400(B) 
The question presented in TC Heartland requires an 
understanding of what the special venue patent statute of 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b) and the general venue statute of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (and, more 
specifically, § 1391(c)) say, and how they interact.  As discussed 
below, between the 1950s and today the general venue statute has been 
amended multiple times;27 the import of those amendments, as seen by 
the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding decision,28 is unclear, and is what 
made the TC Heartland case complicated.  Regardless, the overarching 
statutory framework for patent venue and the applicable case law are 
fairly straightforward.   
a. The Special Patent Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) 
    The special patent venue statute is laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b), which states, “Any civil action for patent infringement may 
be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where 
the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.”29 
    In 1957, the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra 
Products Corporation30 held that this special patent venue statute “is 
the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent 
infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the 
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).”31  The Fourco Glass Court also 
concluded that, as applied to corporate entities, the phrase “where the 
defendant resides” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), “mean[s] the state of 
incorporation only.”32  Thus, under § 1400(b), a patent plaintiff could 
only bring a patent litigation where either: (1) the defendant is 
incorporated; or (2) the defendant has committed acts of infringement 
and has a regular and established place of business.33   
 
27 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
28 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
29 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
30 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957). 
31 Id. at 229.  
32 Id. at 226. 
33 Id. at 225; see also In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
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b. The General Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 
In contrast to the special patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b), the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), (arguably) 
covers venue in all cases not governed by special venue provisions.34 
Where, under the Fourco Glass reading, the concept of “resides” under 
§ 1400(b) turned on where a defendant was incorporated, under the 
general venue statute (in all of its amendments), a defendant “resides” 
anywhere the court has personal jurisdiction.35   
At the time of Fourco Glass, § 1391(c) read, “A corporation 
may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or 
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district 
shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue 
purposes.”36 
Importantly for the development of the law of patent venue, at 
least in the eyes of the Federal Circuit in VE Holding, in 1988, 
Congress amended § 1391(c) to read: “For purposes of venue under 
this chapter [§§ 1391 - 1408], a defendant that is a corporation shall be 
deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to 
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”37 
This amendment is important in two respects.  First, it 
expanded the definition of corporate residence from any district in 
which a corporation was incorporated, licensed to do business, or 
actually doing business to any district in which a corporation was 
subject to personal jurisdiction.38  And second, it changed the 
somewhat vague language for venue purpose to for purposes of venue 
under this chapter.  This somewhat insignificant change in language 
played a significant role in the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding case.   
In 2011, Congress again amended § 1391, so that it now reads 
in part: 
For all venue purposes . . . an entity with the capacity 
to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable 
law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to 
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which 
such defendant is subject to the court’s personal 
 
34 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011); id. at § 1400(b).  
35 Fourco Glass, 353 U.S. at 226; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). 
36 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. (emphasis added). 
38 See id. at § 1391(c) (2011). 
8
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jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question 
and, if a plaintiff, only in the judicial district in which 
it maintains its principal place of business.39 
c. Broadening Patent Venue: VE Holding Corp. v. 
Johnson Gas Appliance Co. 
The critical shift from the Fourco Glass reading of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b) as being the “sole and exclusive provision controlling venue 
in patent infringement actions” that was “not to be supplemented by 
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),”40 came in the Federal Circuit’s 
decision 1990 decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance 
Co.41 In that case, the court, hearing consolidated appeals in which the 
Northern District of California had twice dismissed patent actions for 
improper venue, concluded that the 1988 amendments to § 1391 
discussed above had so changed the law of venue that the Supreme 
Court’s Fourco Glass decision no longer constituted precedent in 
applying §§ 1400(b) and 1391(c).42 Thus, the court concluded, the 
issue was not what the Supreme Court had previously decided, but 
rather “what, as a matter of first impression, should we conclude the 
Congress now intends by this new language in the venue act.”43 
In reaching its decision on this question, the Federal Circuit 
first decided that Congress’s 1988 amendment (i.e., for venue purpose 
to for purposes of venue under this chapter) so changed the meaning 
of §1391(c) as to require §§ 1400(b) and 1391(c) to be read together—
exactly the argument the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass had rejected 
under what the Federal Circuit viewed as the old, nonspecific language 
of the pre-1988 § 1391(c).44  “Congress,” the court concluded, “by its 
1988 amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) meant what it said; the 
meaning of the term ‘resides’ in § 1400(b) has changed.”45  Under this 
new meaning of “resides,” then, “the first test for venue under § 
1400(b) with respect to a defendant that is a corporation . . . is whether 
 
39 See id. at § 1391(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
40 See id. at § 1391(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); Fourco Glass, 353 U.S. at 229. 
41 917 F.2d at 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
42 Id. at 1579. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 1575–76. 
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the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the district of suit 
at the time the action was commenced.”46 
Of course, with such a broad first test—that venue in patent 
cases was appropriate in any district where the court merely had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant—there was no longer any 
need for the second test at all.  After 1990 it was thus no longer 
necessary for courts to ask and consider exactly what constituted a 
regular and established place of business, within the meaning of § 
1400(b).  And so, as a result of VE Holding, the voluminous case law 
on that question fell into disuse, and, critically, no longer developed in 
light of ongoing technological changes in, and the digital and 
computing revolution of, the 1990s and 2000s.    
III. CHALLENGING THE RULE OF VE HOLDING:  
 TC HEARTLAND V. KRAFT 
For decades following the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE 
Holding, parties litigating before the district courts generally accepted 
the Federal Circuit’s broadening of venue for patent infringement 
actions.47  In recent years, however, defendants have increasingly 
focused on the argument that VE Holding was wrongly decided, or at 
least that patent venue should be more narrowly construed in 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).48  TC Heartland itself arose 
from such a circumstance.  Kraft sued TC Heartland, an Indiana 
company, in Delaware, alleging that TC Heartland’s liquid water 
enhancer products, which were shipped into Delaware, infringe Kraft 
patents.49  TC Heartland, which argued that it had no local presence in 
Delaware, moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, or alternatively to transfer 
venue to the Southern District of Illinois.50  In particular, TC Heartland 
argued that Congress’s 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 nullified 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding, just as the Federal Circuit 
in VE Holding had said that the 2008 amendments to § 1391 had 
 
46 VE Holding Corp., 917 F.2d at 1584. 
47 Mosaid Techs. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’n (USA), Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 720 (D. 
Del. 2012); Big Baby Co. v. Schecter, 812 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Kinetic Instruments, 
Inc. v. Lares, 802 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).   
48 DUSA Pharm., Inc. v. River’s Edge Pharm., LLC, 2006 WL 1320049 (D.N.J. 2006). 
49 See In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
50 Id. at 1340. 
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nullified the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco Glass.51  The district 
court rejected TC Heartland’s arguments, and TC Heartland petitioned 
the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus.52  The Federal Circuit 
denied the petition, concluding that the 2011 amendments to § 1391 
had broadened rather than narrowed the “applica[tion] of the definition 
of corporate residence” and therefore had not nullified VE Holding.53 
On September 12, 2016, TC Heartland petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari from the Supreme Court.54  In its petition, TC Heartland 
largely abandoned the argument it had made before the Federal Circuit 
regarding the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and instead 
argued that the Federal Circuit had erred in deciding VE Holding 
because it was the Supreme Court’s “prerogative alone to overrule one 
of its precedents.”55  Critically, the question presented by TC 
Heartland echoed the issue before the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass 
and focused directly on Congress’s venue statute: “Whether 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent 
infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c).”56 Numerous amici, including former Federal Circuit Judge 
Paul R. Michel, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Dell, Inc., and 
fifty-six Professors of Law and Economics (in a brief authored by 
Mark Lemley of Stanford University) filed briefs urging the Court to 
grant certiorari, which it did on December 14, 2016.57   
Although there were some outliers,58 before oral argument 
most commentators appeared to believe that TC Heartland would 
succeed, at least in part, before the Supreme Court.59 Numerous 
 
51 Id. at 1340-41. 
52 Id. at 1340. 
53 Id. at 1341. 
54 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2. 
55 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 
3, 20 (1997)). 
56 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at i. 
57 See generally Brief of the Elec. Frontier Found. & Pub. Knowledge as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 10; Brief of Dell Inc. and the Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-
341); Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Econ. in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, TC Heartland, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Paul R. Michel in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-
341); see also Supreme Court Docket, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/16-341.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).  
58 See, e.g., Risch, supra note 9. 
59 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Hatch Says Patent Venue Reform Likely Regardless                       of 
SCOTUS Decision in TC Heartland, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 16, 2017), 
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influential amici filed briefs seeking to support TC Heartland’s 
position.60  For example, seventeen attorney generals—including the 
attorney general of Texas, the home of the Eastern District of Texas—
signed on to an amicus brief supporting TC Heartland and suggesting 
that their citizens might face “abusive claims of patent infringement, 
which businesses and residents confirm are a drag on economic 
growth.”61 
On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court proved the majority of 
commentators correct when it unanimously overruled the Federal 
Circuit in TC Heartland and in doing so soundly rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning in VE Holding.62 In the decision, Justice Thomas 
writing for the Court reaffirmed that the Court had “definitively and 
unambiguously” held in Fourco that “the word ‘reside[ence]’ in § 
1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied to domestic corporations: 
It refers only to the State of incorporation.”63  Noting that Congress 
had not subsequently amended § 1400(b) and that “neither party asks 
us to reconsider our holding in [Fourco],” Justice Thomas concluded 
that the only question before the Court was whether “Congress 
changed the meaning of § 1400(b) when it amended § 1391.”64 After 
observing that the current version of § 1391 does not contain any 
indication that Congress intended to amend § 1400(b), Justice Thomas 
added that the Court did not see “any material difference” between the 
various “for venue purposes” and “for all venue purposes” language of 
different versions of § 1391.65 Finally, Justice Thomas added that there 
was no indication that Congress in 2011 ratified the Federal Circuit in 
VE Holding—and, “[i]f anything, the 2011 amendments undermine 
that decisions’ rationale.”66  Summarizing the decision, Justice 
Thomas explained that “[w]e therefore hold that a domestic 
corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of 
the patent venue statute.”67 
The victory by TC Heartland will likely have drastic real-world 




60 See Supreme Court Docket, supra note 57. 
61 Brief for the State of Texas et al., supra note 5, at 1. 
62 See, e.g., TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 7-8. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 8. 
65 Id. at 8-9. 
66 Id. at 9. 
67 Id. at 1. 
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Supreme Court so drastically restricted the first (state of incorporation) 
test of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) will be to revive for courts the thorny, fact-
intensive jurisdictional question under the second test of § 1400(b) of 
what exactly constitutes a regular and established place of business 
within the meaning of the statute. 
IV.       PRE-VE HOLDING LAW ON “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED 
PLACE OF BUSINESS” 
Before the Federal Circuit changed the law on patent venue in 
VE Holding, allowing defendants to be sued in any district in which 
the district court had personal jurisdiction,68 patent defendants could 
only be sued where they were incorporated or where they had 
committed acts of infringement and had regular and established 
places of business.69 If a patent holder sued a company in a district that 
was not within the company’s state of incorporation, courts were 
routinely required to address the question of whether that particular 
defendant had a regular and established place of business in that 
particular district.70 Courts generally approached this determination in 
one of three ways: (1) by attempting to articulate a broad test and 
returning to general, higher level governing principles regarding what 
constitutes a regular and established place of business; (2) by 
attempting to fit the facts before them into regularly recurring fact 
patterns; or (3) by simply assessing various non-exhaustive factors that 
courts had previously considered in other cases.71Unsurprisingly, all 
of these approaches occasionally resulted in courts reaching “opposite 
conclusions in substantially similar cases,”72 but courts did not or 
could not create any more rigorous bright-line tests.73 
A. Governing Principles and Broad Tests 
Even with the significant number of cases being decided in 
contradictory ways,74 it is still possible to identify some high-level 
 
68 VE Holding Corp., 917 F.2d at 1576, 1578, 1584. 
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012); Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 223, 226, 229. 
70 See, e.g., Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 2(e). 
71 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8. 
72 OMI Int’l Corp., 648 F. Supp. at 1015. 
73 See, e.g., Shelton v. Schwartz, 131 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1942) (“Nor should the term ‘a 
regular and established place of business’ be narrowed or limited in its construction.  Why 
should it be?  The words do not necessitate nor warrant it.”).  
74 OMI Int’l Corp., 648 F. Supp at 1015. 
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governing principles useful in determining what constituted a regular 
and established place of business.  Indeed, as one treatise noted, 
“[a]lthough no rule has been formulated to determine” whether a 
regular and established place of business exists, “the courts in some 
cases have attempted to state rather broad tests against which the 
statutory requirement of ‘a regular and established place of business’ 
is to be measured.”75 These tests generally focused on the same factors, 
and were stated variously as, for example, whether the defendant: (1) 
“had a regular establishment, maintained, controlled, and paid for by 
it, within the district;”76 (2) “was regularly engaged in carrying on a 
substantial part of its ordinary business on a permanent basis within 
the district, in a physical location over which it exercised some 
measure of control;”77 (3) “carried on a systematic, regular, and 
continuous course of business activity, from a permanent location;”78 
(4) “was engaged in carrying on in a continuous manner a substantial 
part of its ordinary business within the district;”79 or (5) “had an 
established place at which he conducted business, and that the business 
was conducted with such a degree of regularity and permanence as to 
compel the conclusion that the place was a regular and established 
place of business.”80 These governing principles or broad tests could 
be particularly important as parties seek to understand what a ruling in 
TC Heartland might mean in the Internet Age, and courts seek to once 
again apply § 1400(b) in the modern context.   
 
75 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8. 
76 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 
178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“Something more is required. It must appear that a defendant is 
regularly engaged in carrying on a substantial part of its ordinary business on a permanent 
basis in a physical location within the district over which it exercised some measure of 
control.”); Fed. Elec. Prods. Co. v. Frank Adam Elec. Co., 100 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 
Patent Royalties Corp. v Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1935)); 
see also Shelton, 131 F.2d at 808. 
77 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Faberge, Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 559 
(D. Del. 1970); Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Coleco 
Indus., Inc. v. Kransco Mfg., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Clearasite Headwear, 
Inc. v. Paramount Cap Mfg. Co., 204 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Brevel Prods. Corp. v. H & 
B Am. Corp., 202 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Mastantuono, 184 F. Supp. 178). 
78 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co., 232 F. Supp. 38, 
47 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (“There has been a sufficient showing of a systematic, regular and 
continuous course of business activity carried on from a permanent location in New York City 
to constitute a ‘regular and established place of business’ of the defendant.”). 
79 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Phillips v. Baker, 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. 
denied, 314 U.S. 688 (1941)).   
80 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Railex Corp. v. White Mach. Co., 243 F. 
Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). 
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Though it is over thirty years old, simply because it is the most 
recent Federal Circuit case on the meaning of regular and established 
place of business, the Federal Circuit’s 1985 decision in In re Cordis 
Corp.81 is informative and provides a framework for the questions 
courts should be asking in assessing venue determinations in the 
Internet Age and how these general principles might be applied going 
forward.82  In Cordis Corp., Medtronic, a Minnesota company, sued 
Cordis Corporation in the District of Minnesota for patent 
infringement for selling cardiac pacemakers in Minnesota.83Cordis 
moved to dismiss, challenging venue on the ground that it did “not 
have a regular and established place of business in the district of 
Minnesota.”84 The district court denied the motion, and Cordis 
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus.85  The Federal 
Circuit denied the petition, ruling that venue was appropriate in the 
District of Minnesota.86 In its analysis, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged the facts found by the district court demonstrating that 
Cordis did not have a strong connection with Minnesota, including that 
Cordis, a Florida corporation, was not registered to do business in 
Minnesota, did not have a bank account in Minnesota, and did not own 
or lease any property within the state.87  But to market its pacemakers 
in Minnesota, Cordis employed two full-time sales representatives, 
who worked from offices they maintained in their homes, where they 
stored Cordis literature, documents, and products.88 These sales 
representatives provided doctors with pacemakers for individual 
surgeries, and acted as technical consultants, actually joining the 
surgeons in the operating rooms during implantations of the 
pacemakers.89 Cordis also “engaged a secretarial service in Minnesota, 
named ‘I Got It Secretarial,’ to receive messages, provide typing 
services, mail Cordis literature and receive shipments of Cordis sales 
literature.”90  Cordis’s sales representatives carried business cards 
listing the telephone number answered by that secretarial service; 
 
81 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733. 
82 See, e.g., id. 
83 Id. at 734. 
84 Id. 
85 Id 
86 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 734. 
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phone calls to the number on these business cars were answered 
“Cordis Corporation.”91  Cordis’s name and telephone number was 
listed in the Minneapolis telephone directory at the address of “I Got 
It Secretarial.”92 
In denying the petition and finding venue in Minnesota 
appropriate, the Federal Circuit explicitly addressed a Ninth Circuit 
case, Phillips v. Baker,93and a Seventh Circuit case, University of 
Illinois Foundation v. Channel Master,94relied on by Cordis.95  In 
Phillips, the court observed, at issue was whether venue was proper in 
California for a Florida corporation,  
which provided a seasonal pre-cooling operation for 
grain shippers which was conducted by means of a fully 
transportable apparatus which was assembled at each 
location, kept in place until the procedure was 
performed and then dismantled for conveyance to the 
next location either within or without the jurisdiction.96  
Thus, in Phillips, the company’s presence within the district “was 
merely temporary, and there was no way to contact its representatives 
except by communication with the home office in Florida.”97 
In Channel Master, at issue was whether venue was appropriate 
in Illinois in a suit against a New York manufacturer of television 
antennas where Channel Master’s “sole employee worked from his 
home in Illinois promoting sales of his employer’s products,” but did 
not keep stock there, and all orders from customers “were accepted in 
the New York home office, all shipments were made from the home 
office to customers and all payments by customers were made to that 
office.”98  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit observed, these cases stand 
for the proposition that,  
in determining whether a corporate defendant has a 
regular and established place of business in a district, 
the appropriate inquiry is whether the corporate 
 
91 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 735. 
92 Id. 
93 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,  314 U.S. 688 (1941).  
94 382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967). 
95 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 736-37 (discussing Phillips, 121 F.2d 752; Univ. 
of Ill. Found. v. Channel Master, 382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967)). 
96 Id. at 736 (quoting Phillips, 121 F.2d 752). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 737 (citing Channel Master, 382 F.2d 514). 
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defendant does its business in that district through a 
permanent and continuous presence there and not . . . 
whether it has a fixed physical presence in the sense of 
a formal office or store.99 
The court then concluded that the record in the Cordis Corp. case 
“indicates that a rational and substantial legal argument may be made 
in support of the court’s order denying Cordis’ motion to dismiss.”100 
To summarize, in general terms, as suggested by the Cordis 
court, the pre-VE Holding case law relied upon by courts suggest that 
a corporate defendant’s regular and established place of business is the 
place where it does business “through a permanent and continuous 
presence” in the district, although “a fixed physical presence in the 
sense of a formal office or store” is not required.101   
As the Supreme Court concluded earlier in Fourco Glass, and 
as other courts thereafter recognized, “merely doing business” in the 
district is not sufficient.102  That said, several courts have suggested 
that, even if a fixed physical presence is not required, there must 
nonetheless be some physical presence in the district.103  Indeed, even 
 
99 Id.  
100 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 737.  
101 Id.; see also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., No. CIV. 4-
86-359, 1987 WL 10997, at *3-5 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 1987); Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. 
Waters Assocs., Inc., No. 76 C 4340, 1977 WL 22810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 1977).  Courts 
have also concluded that presence at periodic trade shows is not sufficient. See, e.g., Knapp-
Monarch Co. v. Casco Prod. Corp., 342 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he [trade] show 
itself may have been a semiannual event and thus ‘regular’ in that sense, [Defendant’s] 
participation in it constituted a temporary presence in Chicago rather than a regular and 
established place where one could transact business with the defendant from day to day and 
from month to month.”); Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756 (explaining defendant operated infringing 
apparatus at sites of various customers on a job basis: “the necessary element of permanency 
is lacking”); Id. (noting further where appellees “merely conduct precooling operations in a 
box car temporarily standing at a railroad siding, which car is there one day and gone the 
next . . . . The Standard Fruit Company’s establishment was just a location for a ‘particular 
transaction’; the necessary element of permanency is lacking.”). 
102 Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 226; see, e.g., Holub Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 
854 (4th Cir. 1961) (“The jurisdictional provisions of the federal statutes as thus interpreted 
must of course take precedence over the provisions of the process statutes of South Carolina 
however the latter may be regarded in the courts of that state.”). 
103 See, e.g., Michod v. Walker Magnetics Grp., Inc., 115 F.R.D. 345, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1987) 
(“Courts have consistently held that an alleged patent infringer has a ‘regular and established 
place of business’ in a judicial district only if it actually has a place of business there; activities 
such as the maintenance of independent sales agents, visits by company representatives, and 
the solicitation of orders are not enough.” (citing Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., 
Inc., 531 F.2d 1382, 1386-88 (7th Cir. 1976); Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420 
F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (7th Cir.1969))). 
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registering as a foreign corporation for service of process within a 
state, while that would constitute doing business for the purposes of 
personal jurisdiction, is not sufficient to establish a regular and 
established place of business.104  It is these general principles, then, 
which would likely continue to form the basis of a general test should 
the Supreme Court rule in TC Heartland’s favor.   
B. Recurring Fact Patterns 
As discussed previously, as one of the leading patent law 
treatises notes, many of the pre-VE Holding cases focusing on what 
constitutes a regular and established place of business in the context 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) fall into regular categories of recurring fact 
patterns.105 Unsurprisingly, these fact patterns relate closely to what 
factors courts found relevant or irrelevant to the regular and 
established place of business determination.106 Chisum identifies these 
four recurring fact patterns as: (1) the “Traveling Salesman Cases;” (2) 
the “Sales Office Cases;” (3) the “Independent Sales Representative 
Cases;” and (4) the “Parent and Subsidiary Corporations—Separate 
Divisions Cases.”107 These recurring patterns in fact capture many of 
the regular and established place of business cases, and are useful in 
understanding the sorts of cases that raised this test as an issue in 
deciding patent venue questions before VE Holding.108  Those fact 
patterns generally followed the following sorts of structures: 
1. The Traveling Salesman Cases 
In the Traveling Salesman fact pattern, the defendant’s only 
connection with the foreign district is through a traveling salesman, 
who does not operate from a fixed physical location, who solicits 
orders that are forwarded outside the district to be acknowledged and 
fulfilled elsewhere.109  Courts generally concluded that such limited 
contacts with the foreign districts were not sufficient to meet the 
 
104 See, e.g., Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 681 F. Supp. 959, 964 (D. Mass. 1987) (“The fact that 
[the Defendant] is registered as a foreign corporation in Massachusetts is of no import, for 
mere ‘doing business’ in Massachusetts is not enough to satisfy the pertinent venue statute.”). 
105 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02.  
106 See, e.g., infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text. 
107 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02. 
108 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02. 
109 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02. 
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requirement that defendants have a regular and established place of 
business in those districts.110  So, for example, in American Cyanamid 
Co. v. NOPCO Chem. Co.,111 the Fourth Circuit found no regular and 
established place of business for a defendant in the Western District of 
Virginia where the defendant NOPCO employed in West Virginia a 
Regional Sales Manager, who supervised four salesmen operating over 
a ten-state area and who maintained, without NOPCO’s knowledge, a 
home office in which he stored brochures.112 Similarly, in University 
of Illinois Foundation v. Channel Master Corp.,113 discussed supra, 
the Seventh Circuit found that Channel Master did not have a regular 
and established place of business in Illinois where Channel Master’s 
single employee “use[d] his home in that district as a base for his sales 
activities,” but did not keep stock there, and “[a]ll orders from 
customers in the district are accepted in New York.  All shipments to 
customers are made from New York.  All payments for goods are made 
to New York.”114And similarly too, in Johnson & Johnson v. 
Picard,115 the Sixth Circuit found that a Philadelphia defendant had no 
regular and established place of business in North Carolina simply 
because the defendant had only a salesman in North Carolina who 
solicited orders in North Carolina, South Carolina, and part of Virginia 
and forwarded all orders to Philadelphia for acceptance.116 
Of course, even though this was the general rule, the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in In re Cordis Corp. (a case that dealt more 
specifically with a sales office rather than a traveling sales force) at 
least opened the door for district courts, in certain circumstances, to 
find even the presence of traveling salesmen sufficient to meet the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).117 
 
110 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02. 
111 388 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968). 
112 Id. at 819-20. 
113 382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967). 
114 Id. at 515-16. 
115 282 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1960). 
116 Id. at 388.  
117 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Minnesota Mining & 
Mfg. Co., 1987 WL 10997, at *3 (“[U]ndue focus on the existence of an office with defendant’s 
name on the door ignores economic realities and invites manipulation of venue.”); Shelter-
Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., 356 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (“In this Court’s opinion, 
an unyielding rule that a regular and established place of business cannot arise by virtue of a 
salesman operating out of his residence is at odds with the practicalities and necessities of the 
business community.”). 
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2. The Sales Office Cases 
In the Sales Office fact pattern, the defendant’s contact with the 
foreign district is through maintenance of a sales office solely for the 
purpose of soliciting and forwarding orders.118  Just as with the 
Traveling Salesmen cases, courts in Sales Office cases generally 
concluded that such limited contacts with the foreign districts were not 
sufficient to meet the requirement that defendants have a regular and 
established place of business in those districts.119  In part, this was as 
a result of the Supreme Court’s 1915 decision in W.S. Tyler Co. v. 
Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co.120  In that case, the Court concluded in an 
extremely short opinion that a Missouri corporation which 
manufactured screens in St. Louis did not have a regular and 
established place of business in New York.121  The plaintiff had argued 
to the contrary, pointing out that the defendant had employed (on 
salary and commission) an “Eastern representative” in New York as a 
salesman, and that this representative maintained a room in New York 
he used as the headquarters of both defendant and another company he 
was representing and solicited orders for wire screens and forwarded 
those orders to St. Louis for execution.122  Given the shortness of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, it was not clear whether the Court’s decision 
turned on the salesman’s lack of authority to accept orders, sharing of 
the headquarters between two companies, or simultaneous 
representation of more than one corporation.123  That said, courts 
regularly found that there was no regular and established place of 
business when an office or representative was shared by more than one 
company,124 when the salesman paid for his office or showroom 
himself,125 or when the salesman’s only responsibility with orders was 
to forward them out of the district to the defendant company.126     
 
118 See 14D CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 
3823 (4th ed. 2011). 
119 Id.   
120 236 U.S. 723 (1915). 
121 Id. at 725.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See, e.g., Frink Co. v. Erikson, 20 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1927). 
125 See, e.g., Erickson v. Emerson, 40 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Clearasite Headware, 
Inc., 204 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
126 See, e.g., Gen. Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949, 950 (1st Cir. 1961) (finding 
no regular and established place of business in Massachusetts for a Connecticut company 
where the company maintains a salesman in Massachusetts who “has no authority to 
acknowledge or accept” orders, and instead forwards them to Connecticut, “which is the only 
20
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3. The Independent Sales Representative Cases 
In the Independent Sales Representative fact pattern, the 
defendant’s contact with the foreign district is through distribution in 
the district of products through an independent representative or 
agent.127  With this fact pattern, once again, courts generally concluded 
that such limited contacts with the foreign districts were not sufficient 
to meet the requirement that defendants have a regular and established 
place of business in those districts.128  Representative of such cases is 
Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc.,129 in which the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that there was no regular and established place of 
business in Illinois for a California maker of industrial laundry dryers 
whose products were distributed in Illinois by a third party, upon 
whom the complaint was served.130  As the court explained in 
analyzing the claim: 
Washburn Machinery’s distributorship of Challenge-
Cook dryers in the district is non-exclusive as to both 
area and product line.  Washburn maintains its own 
service department and will service Challenge-Cook 
dryers.  It carries ‘at least a few parts’ for the 
Challenge-Cook dryers and can get others ‘quite fast’ 
from a Challenge-Cook plant in Ohio.  Challenge-Cook 
maintains some control over its distributors in that it 
reserves the right to terminate the 
distributorship.  Washburn arranges a sale of a 
Challenge-Cook dryer with a purchaser in the Northern 
District of Illinois and sends a purchase order to 
Challenge-Cook in California. Challenge-Cook then 
ships the dryer either to the purchaser or to Washburn 
as Washburn directs.  It invoices Washburn for the sale 
price less a percentage discount.  The purchaser pays 
 
place where the order can be acknowledged and accepted”); Hoegger v. F.H. Lawson & Co., 
35 F.2d 219, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (finding no regular and established place of business in 
New York for an Ohio company that employs a salesman who “is not authorized to and does 
not consummate sales”). 
127 See Cordis Corp. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 599 F.2d. 1085, 1086-87 (1st Cir. 1979). 
128 Id. at 1087. 
129 420 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1969). 
130 Id. at 1186. 
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Washburn.  Washburn has available catalogues and 
literature which display the Challenge-Cook name.131 
While this was the general rule, courts made exceptions and instead 
found that defendants did have regular and established places of 
business—when the defendants had greater control of the 
“independent” sales representatives than was the case in Grantham.132   
4. The Parent and Subsidiary Corporations Cases 
In the Parent and Subsidiary Corporation fact pattern, the 
defendant’s contact with the foreign district is through control of (or 
control by) a parent or subsidiary corporation.133  In these cases, in 
keeping with the Supreme Court’s general guidance regarding the 
importance of corporate formalities in keeping parents and subsidiaries 
separate,134 courts generally found that foreign defendants which 
merely had subsidiaries in districts did not themselves have regular and 
established places of business in the target districts.135  So, for 
example, in L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v. Clearfield Co.,136 the court 
found that the parent defendant H.P. Hood Co. did not have a regular 
and established place of business in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, even though its wholly owned subsidiary, Clearfield 
Cheese Company, was located there.137  In concluding that patent 
venue was not proper for H.P. Hood, the court conceded that “there is 
some overlap of officers and directors . . . “that Hood provides 
Clearfield with marketing assistance and sets quality control standards 
for Clearfield,” that the two companies were represented by the same 
counsel, and that “one employee of Clearfield does not consider Hood 
to be an outside company.”138  “On the other hand,” the court added, 
the two companies maintained separate bank accounts and paid 
 
131 Id. at 1184.  
132 See, e.g., Davis v. Motive Parts Corp., 16 F.2d 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (finding regular and 
established place of business in New York for Wisconsin company where the distributor dealt 
exclusively in products of defendant, even though the distributor was not able to bind the 
defendant company). 
133 See generally Pfizer Inc. v. Mylan Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 483 (D. Del. 2016).  
134 See, e.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (holding that service on a 
foreign corporation cannot be obtained through service on a wholly owned subsidiary provided 
that there is real corporate separation between the parent and the subsidiary). 
135 Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983).  
136 495 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
137 Id. at 317. 
138 Id. at 318-19. 
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separate taxes, have separate officers and directors, and “are treated as 
separate entities for accounting purposes.”139 “[V]enue,” the court 
ultimately concluded, “is proper with respect to a parent corporation 
only when that parent has disregarded all but the formalities of 
separation in its dealings with its subsidiaries.”140 
In contrast, where the facts demonstrated a different 
relationship between the parent and subsidiary, courts generally found 
that, where the controlling defendant corporation ignored corporate 
formalities, and treated the subsidiary as part of the parent, the 
subsidiaries did count as regular and established places of business for 
the defendant corporations.141  So, for example, the court in State 
Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc.142 concluded that an in-district 
subsidiary, American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation, was, in 
effect, “part and parcel” of defendant Mor-Flo Industries, where: 
Research and development, manufacturing, marketing 
and management of Mor-Flo and American appear to 
be inextricably intertwined.  American is completely 
dominated in its operations by its parent, Mor-Flo 
acting through its officers and directors. Mor-Flo not 
only completely owns American, but it completely 
controls American such that American has no ‘separate 
mind, will or existence of its own.’143   
And, following the same logic, the courts also generally concluded that 
a defendant corporation had a regular and established place of business 
in a district where the defendant unquestionably had a corporate 
division in the district, even if the alleged infringing activity was 
 
139 Id. at 319. 
140 Id. at 318; see also Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Epsco, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 260, 
264 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (“There is not present in the instant case the immediate and direct 
intervention in the subsidiary’s affairs and transactions . . . to be sufficient to fuse parent and 
subsidiary.”); Shapiro v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 350, 356 (D. Md. 1973) (explaining 
that a subsidiary corporation was not alter ego of parent, and so it did not give rise to venue 
for the parent in the district under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)). 
141 See generally State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., No. CIV-2-84-276, 1986 WL 87793 
(E.D. Tenn. May 29, 1986). 
142 Id.  
143 Id. at *1; see also, e.g., Am. Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 333, 
336 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (explaining a subsidiary constitutes regular and established place of 
business for parent where there was an “intermingling of corporate identities in the day-to-day 
operations” of the parent); Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 1325, 1332 (D. 
Mass. 1975) (finding venue in district of subsidiary for parent where “[c]loser examination of 
its activities reveals, however, a carefully-sewn web of interrelationships and interdependence 
between parent and subsidiary making its individual identity more apparent than real.”). 
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committed by an entirely separate division that was not located in the 
district.144   
C. Relevant and Irrelevant Factors 
Even if it is true, as the District of Minnesota noted in 1958, 
that “no reliable test has been devised by which a court can determine 
whether or not a foreign corporation maintains a regular and 
established place of business within any certain District,”145 it is also 
true that the general principles and broad tests and the recurring fact 
patterns, all discussed above,146 together identify numerous non-
exhaustive and intertwined factors that are or were all relevant to courts 
in the pre-Internet age considering what in each case constituted a 
regular and established place of business.147  Among these non-
exhaustive and non-determinative factors are: (1) whether the 
defendant owned or rented facilities in the district;148 (2) whether the 
defendant consummated sales or maintained a stock of goods in the 
 
144 See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Amerace Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(“[A]ny corporate division, not necessarily the division accused of infringing the patent, meets 
the statutory requirement.” (citing Gaddis v. Calgon Corp., 449 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th 
Cir.1971))). 
145 Up-Right, Inc., 165 F. Supp. at 744. 
146 See supra notes 68-145 and accompanying text. 
147 But see Brevel Prod. Corp., 202 F. Supp. at 829 (warning that “[i]t is not simply a matter 
of numerical accumulation of factors.  Courts have often recognized many or most of the 
above factors as being present, and yet declined to accept jurisdiction”). 
148 See, e.g., IPCO Hosp. Supply Corp. (Whaledent Int’l Div.) v. Les Fils D’Auguste Maillefer 
S.A., 446 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no regular and established place of 
business where defendant “does not own, lease or control any place of business or ‘physical 
location’ within the Southern District of New York”); Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co., 232 
F. Supp. 38, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (finding a regular and established place of business for Illinois 
company in New York where the company leased a New York office which had the defendant 
company’s name on the door, which was staffed by a full-time stenographer and was under 
the supervision of a sales manager who also occupied the office on a full-time basis); Shelton, 
131 F.2d at 806 (7th Cir. 1942) (finding a regular and established place of business where a 
company rented an office, with its name on the door, in Chicago, and the lease called for 
payment of rent by the defendant for “an office for said company’s business”); Hazeltine Corp. 
v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 6 F. Supp. 813, 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (finding a regular and established 
place of business in E.D.N.Y. where the S.D.N.Y. defendant corporation leased two garages 
in E.D.N.Y. at which it housed much of its taxi fleet and kept staff and employees); Scott & 
Williams v. Hemphill Co., 14 F. Supp. 621, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (finding a regular and 
established place of business in New York where a Rhode Island corporation rented a New 
York showroom in the charge of a sales representative and secretary and the corporation 
identified the showroom as a “branch office”).  
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district;149 (3) whether the defendant paid employees’ salaries or paid 
for office expenses in the foreign district;150 (4) whether the defendant 
had company names listed in telephone or other directories;151 and (5) 
whether the defendant controlled sales agencies or subsidiary 
corporations in the foreign district.152 
 
149 See, e.g., Werner Mach. Co. v. Nat’l Cooperatives, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 962, 964 (E.D. Wis. 
1968) (finding a regular and established place of business for defendant in Wisconsin where 
the defendant’s employee in Wisconsin “does more than solicit business; he has the authority 
to and does complete sales”); Fed. Elec. Prod. Co. v. Frank Adam Elec. Co., 100 F. Supp. 8, 
11 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (finding “a regular and established place of business” where defendant 
owned a building in New York “which it uses to stockpile its products”); Philad Co. v. Nat’l 
Mineral Co., 14 F. Supp. 625, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (finding a regular and established place of 
business in New York where “it is evident that the New York office is more than an outlying 
post for soliciting orders.  A line of the defendant’s products is kept there and is 
demonstrated.  A substantial stock of merchandise is kept there, and sales of spare parts and 
accessories are made there, customers taking delivery and making cash payment in the 
office.”); Am. Sales Book Co. v. Atl. Register Co., 14 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) 
(suggesting that the determinative reason a Massachusetts defendant had a regular and 
established place of business in New York was because the New York office was used for 
“more than mere soliciting of sales.  The defendant kept a stock of goods in it for 
demonstration purposes.  Occasional sales from this stock were made at the office.  At least 
one delivery of a writing device was made from the office.”). 
150 See, e.g., Urquhart v. Am.-La France Foamite Corp., 144 F.2d 542, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1944) 
(fidning a regular and established place of business where defendant “maintains an office in 
the District.  Its name is displayed on the door and listed in the telephone directory.  The office 
force consists of a manager, a stenographer and two salesmen.  The salesmen not only take 
orders for the defendant’s products in the District but also in neighboring states.”); Briggs v. 
Fram Corp., 272 F. Supp. 185, 186 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (finding a regular and established place of 
business where defendant “pays all the expenses of the zone sales office, including secretary’s 
wages, telephone, telegraph and other office expenses and insurance [and where] [s]ix district 
sales managers and two engineers, all full time employees of [defendant], work out of the zone 
office”); Ronson Art Metal Works v. Brown & Bigelow, 104 F. Supp. 716, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 
1952) (finding a regular and established place of business in New York where the defendant’s 
vice-president in charge of its eastern sales division “has his headquarters within this district 
and performs here such executive                            functions as supervision of district sales 
managers, territory alignment, sales planning,                manpower management and 
recommendations on hiring and firing salesmen . . . . Other salaried personnel of defendant 
handling special sales, recruiting of personnel and field sales training operate from within this 
district”). 
151 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 735 (finding a regular and established place of 
business where the “Minneapolis telephone directory includes Cordis’ name and telephone 
number and lists the address of the secretarial service as Cordis’ address”); Urquhart, 144 F.2d 
at 543 (finding a regular and established place of business where defendant’s “name is 
displayed on the door and listed in the telephone directory”); Shelton, 131 F.2d at 806 (finding 
a regular and established place of business where a company rented an office, with its name 
on the door, in Chicago); Watsco, Inc., 232 F. Supp. at 47 (finding a regular and established 
place of business for Illinois company in New York where the New York office had the 
defendant company’s name on the door). 
152 See, e.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Bullock Elec. Co., 101 F. 587, 589 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1900) (finding a regular and established place of business in New York for Ohio company 
where the Ohio defendant controlled sales by a New York affiliate), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
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Moreover, just as there are (or were, pre-VE Holding) relevant 
factors for considering whether there is a regular and established place 
of business, there are other factors that the courts have deemed 
irrelevant to this question.  The most important or universal, which 
was derived from a 1915 Supreme Court decision, is that merely 
soliciting orders—by itself—within a judicial district is not sufficient 
to show that the defendant has a regular and established place of 
business.153  Courts have also concluded that there is no regular and 
established place of business where: (1) a defendant maintains an 
office in the foreign district but staffs the office with salesmen who 
work on commission or forward all orders for goods to defendant, 
outside the district, to be fulfilled;154 (2) the defendant retains 
employees in a foreign district who work solely out of their home 
offices;155 (3) defendants employ traveling salesmen who travel 
 
sub nom. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 107 F. 277 (2d Cir. 1901); 
Leach Co. v. Gen. Sani-Can Mfg. Corp., 393 F.2d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1968) (finding a regular 
and established place of business for New York company in Illinois based on the operations 
of subsidiary in Illinois where “the corporate form of [Defendant’s] Midwest operation was 
the sheerest of shells to cloak his real agency . . . .”). 
153 W.S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., 236 U.S. 723, 725 (1915); see also Werner 
Mach. Co. v. Nat’l Cooperatives, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 962, 964 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Brevel Prod. 
Corp., 202 F. Supp. at 829 (finding no regular and established place of business in New York 
where the orders for defendant’s products were solicited by an independent sales 
representative in New York). 
154 See, e.g., W.S. Tyler Co., 236 U.S. at 725; Gen. Radio Co., 293 F.2d at 950 (finding no 
regular and established place of business in Massachusetts for a Connecticut company where 
the company maintains a salesman in Massachusetts who “has no authority to acknowledge or 
accept” orders, and instead forwards them to Connecticut, “which is the only place where the 
order can be acknowledged and accepted”); Morse v. Master Specialties Co., 239 F. Supp. 
641, 642 (D.N.J. 1964) (finding no regular and established place of business for California 
company in New Jersey where the California company maintained a New Jersey office, which 
was closed before the litigation, but the office was staffed with two engineers who “were 
employed in the New Jersey office to solicit business no orders were accepted or rejected in 
New Jersey but were all transmitted directly to the California offices for approval and 
shipment”); Hoegger v. F.H. Lawson & Co., 35 F.2d 219, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (finding no 
regular and established place of business in New York for an Ohio company that employs a 
salesman who “is not authorized to and does not consummate sales”). 
155 See, e.g., Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 420 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding 
no regular and established place of business in Illinois where the regional sales manager lived 
in Illinois and occasionally worked out of his home, but “he was free to live where he chose 
so far as [Defendant] was concerned,” and “Plaintiffs’ proofs failed to show what, if any, use 
Schmidt made of his home in connection with his employment”); Railex Corp. v. White Mach. 
Co., 243 F. Supp. 381, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding no regular and established place of 
business in E.D.N.Y. where the New Jersey defendant’s salesman occasionally worked from 
his home on Long Island); Up-Right, Inc., 165 F. Supp. at 744. 
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through and work in a foreign district;156 (4) defendants have 
franchises in foreign districts;157 or (5) defendants participate in trade 
shows in foreign districts.158 
V.  APPLYING OLD CASE LAW TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN THE INTERNET AGE 
Now that the Supreme Court has accepted TC Heartland’s 
argument, and in doing so has strengthened the import of 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b) to venue determinations in patent cases, it will likely once 
again become necessary for courts to determine what constitutes a 
“regular and established place of business.”  But, as noted previously, 
the changed circumstances of the Internet Age from the business world 
of the 1940s-1980s suggest that there could be some significant 
problems with attempting to fit modern fact patterns into historical 
examples, or even with applying more general principles or broad tests 
formulated in that earlier period to facts as they exist today.  Put 
another way, the world of the 1920s-1980s is not a perfect fit with the 
world of the 2010s, and trying to shoehorn modern technologies into 
decades-old case law might in some cases inappropriately expand 
patent venue beyond what the statute says or what Congress 
intended.  Without attempting to be exhaustive, below we briefly 
discuss three specific fact patterns of new ways of doing business in 
the Internet Age that highlight these concerns: (1) the Uber model; (2) 




156 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Picard, 282 F.2d 386, 388 (6th Cir. 1960) (finding no 
regular and established place of business in North Carolina for Philadelphia defendant whose 
salesman in North Carolina solicits orders in North Carolina, South Carolina, and part of 
Virginia and forwards all orders to Philadelphia for acceptance).  
157 See, e.g., Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 974, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding no 
regular and established place of business in New York for New Jersey company that 
manufactured swimming pools where the New York corporation selling the pools was 
operating under a franchise). 
158 See, e.g., Mastantuono, 184 F. Supp. at 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“Something more is 
required.”); L. E. Waterman Co v. Parker Pen Co., 100 F. 544, 544 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1900) 
(finding no regular and established place of business in Pennsylvania for Wisconsin defendant 
that merely “occupied a space in the recent National Export Exposition in the city of 
Philadelphia as an exhibitor of merchandise”); Knapp-Monarch Co., 342 F.2d at 625 (finding 
no regular and established place of business for defendant in Chicago where defendant was 
merely participating in a semiannual trade show). 
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A. Unchanged and Current Business Structures and 
Practices 
As an initial matter, even though the world of the 2010s is 
vastly different from the world of the 1980s, much less the 1920s, it is 
certainly true that many business practices have nonetheless remained 
constant.159  So, for example, there would likely be no problem with 
courts addressing what constitutes a regular and established place of 
business applying pre-VE Holding case law where a defendant has a 
permanent brick-and-mortar store, a corporate headquarters, or a 
manufacturing plant in a particular district.  These cases do not even 
present close questions: nothing about the changing technological 
landscape of the past thirty years has altered what it means to have 
such facilities in a district.  Prior to VE Holding, all such defendants 
would have been judged to have a regular and established place of 
business in the district, and it makes sense that courts today would 
apply the pre-VE Holding case law to reach the same results.  Such 
cases could alternatively be decided either by considering the various 
factors pre-VE Holding courts considered, by analogizing to a 
recurring fact-pattern, or even by applying the broader sort of test 
identified by the Federal Circuit in In re Cordis Corp.160  And, indeed, 
every company with this sort of business in the relevant district would 
certainly meet the Cordis Corp. test of doing business in the district 
“through a permanent and continuous presence.”161 
B. Abandoned and Obsolete Business Structures and 
Practices 
On the other hand, because of the vastly different technological 
worlds of the 1920s – 1980s and today, other business practices and 
structures, including those that helped form the basis for what Chisum 
on Patents considered to be regularly recurring fact patterns or what 
were regularly factors considered by courts, are now largely or entirely 
obsolete or abandoned.  As one example, it used to be the case that, to 
market their goods, companies needed to depend upon traveling 
salesmen.162  In the modern, Internet-driven age, however, traveling 
salesmen are, if not entirely obsolete, much less 
 
159 See generally supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text. 
160 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
161 Id. at 737. 
162 See, e.g., supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text. 
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/3
2017 PATENT VENUE IN THE INTERNET AGE 703 
prevalent.163  Accordingly, the pre-VE Holding traveling salesmen 
cases are far less relevant to how business is conducted today than they 
would have been decades ago.  As another example, courts engaged in 
the regular and established place of business analysis regularly 
considered whether defendant corporations were listed in telephone 
directories.164  But again, in the Internet Age where all it takes is a 
quick Google search to find a company’s contact information, 
telephone directories are antiquated and nearly or entirely obsolete, 
and so this factor should no longer be relevant one way or the other.   
It could be argued that such cases and considerations could be 
used to analogize to more modern issues.  For example, the traveling 
salesmen of the 1920s – 1980s could conceivably be like Internet-
based sales today, and the telephone directories of the 1950s – 1980s 
could conceivably be like listings on mapping programs or search 
engines today.  But such analogies, while intellectually interesting, 
seem strained, and are likely not the best ways to reach determination 
on what 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) means when it lays out the requirements 
for venue in patent infringement actions. 
1. The Uber Model 
The Uber Model refers to an app-driven business model, in 
which a company is located in one physical location, but employs or 
contracts with individuals elsewhere provide services in the company’s 
name.165  So, Uber, which is headquartered in California, contracts 
with individual drivers spread throughout the United States and the 
world.166  Those drivers use Uber’s app, running on their smartphones, 
to connect with consumers seeking rides from Uber.167  But imagine 
that a patent-holder wants to sue Uber in a district where Uber (1) 
provides rides to tens of thousands of passengers each day, (2) does 
significant advertising, and (3) receives a significant and consistent 
revenue stream, but where Uber does not have an office, does not have 
any employees, and retains drivers as independent contractors.  A court 
 
163 Laura Linard, Birth of the American Salesman, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/birth-of-the-american-salesman.  
164 See, e.g., supra note 151. 
165 See generally Farhad Manjoo, Uber’s Business Model Could Change Your Work, N.Y. 
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attempting to determine whether Uber has a regular and established 
place of business in that district would clearly have to face questions 
not addressed in the pre-VE Holding case law and likely not imagined 
by Congress when it passed 28 U.S.C. § 1400.  While, as with the cases 
of the traveling salesmen and the telephone directories discussed 
above, lawyers and judges could once again attempt to analogize from 
pre-VE Holding fact patterns and factors to the Uber situation, doing 
so would seem to be a stretch and would not clearly yield the right 
results under the venue statute.  Indeed, in the Uber-model fact pattern 
set forth above, it is unclear whether venue would be appropriate.  For 
example, the lack of a physical presence in the District may suggest 
that merely soliciting business in the District through independent 
contractors (i.e., Uber drivers) may not be enough.   
2. The Telecommuting Model 
The Telecommuting Model refers to a model in which a 
company’s employees, aided by changes in technology, work from 
their homes rather than from a company’s brick and mortar 
facility.168  While in the pre-VE Holding period people could and did 
work from home offices, changes in technology have now made it 
possible for people to do so seamlessly, without their co-workers, 
employers, or customers necessarily knowing.  But imagine that a New 
Hampshire corporation employs an employee who lives in 
Massachusetts, and who (with the company’s permission) regularly 
works from his or her home in Massachusetts instead of from the 
permanent office in New Hampshire.  Or imagine instead that the 
employee only works from a Massachusetts home office, and in fact 
never works from New Hampshire.  Under the pre-VE Holding case 
law, courts did consider whether working from a home office 
constituted a regular and established place of business.169  But those 
cases were decided in a vastly different context, where working from 
a home office had significantly different implications for how a 
business operates.  And, once again, attempting to analogize between 
those very different 1920s–1980s cases and modern telecommuting 
 
168 See generally Jin-Ru Yen & Hani S. Mahmassani, Telecommuting Adoption:          
Conceptual Framework and Model Estimation, RESEARCHGATE, (Jan. 1997), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/245557612_Telecommuting_Adoption_Conceptua
l_Framework_and_Model_Estimation. 
169  See, e.g., supra note 155. 
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seems strained, and not necessarily the approach that would yield a 
correct application of 28 U.S.C. § 1400.  Moreover, complicating this 
analysis is the fact that determining venue under the Telecommuting 
Model is a heavily fact-dependent inquiry that should address, among 
other factors, the number of individuals that are telecommunicating 
from the District, the nature of the business that each person is doing, 
and whether each individual telecommunicated full time or part time.  
3. The Web Services/Server Farm Model 
The Web Services/Server Farm model refers to a business 
model in which a corporation located in one district contracts with 
another company (such as Amazon Web Services) to provide all of the 
defendant corporation’s computing functionality.170  Thus, a media 
corporation located in New York might contract with Amazon Web 
Services, which has offices and servers in Washington state,171 to 
handle all digital storage, financial transactions, and back-end 
computing.  Imagine, in such a case, that a plaintiff wants to sue the 
defendant corporation for patent infringement.  Clearly, under 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) the plaintiff could sue in New York; a much more 
difficult question is whether the plaintiff could also sue in Washington, 
where the defendant (through its contracts) utilizes physical servers, 
and conducts much of its regular business.  Again, it might be possible 
to analogize between pre-VE Holding case law on sales offices and 
providers of web services or server farms, but once again such 
analogies feel strained and potentially anachronistic.  Nevertheless, 
depending on the facts of each case, the presence of servers in a 
particular jurisdiction to simply host data and provide some computing 
functionality without more may be too tenuous of a connection to make 
venue appropriate.  
C. Higher-Level Principles and Broad Tests 
The discussion above lays out just a few ways to think about 
analogizing how business is conducted in the Internet Age to how 
business was conducted in the twentieth century for the purposes of 
 
170 See Server Farm, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/server_farm.html 
(last visited April 29, 2017). 
171 See generally Ingrid Burrington, Why Amazon’s Data Centers are Hidden in Spy Country, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/ amazon-
web-services-data-center/423147/. 
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determining whether a defendant has a “regular and established place 
of business” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).  Again, while 
it can be an interesting intellectual exercise to do so, it is not clear that 
analogizing in this fashion will generate decisions that appropriately 
correspond to what the statute means when it refers to regular and 
established places of business.  The truth is that Congress in enacting 
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) could not possibly have had in mind even old 
technology, such as ATMs,172 much less technology such as 
smartphones, server farms, or concepts such as social media.  That 
these technologies would have been (in the Supreme Court’s words) 
“nearly inconceivable”173 to courts deciding pre-VE Holding cases 
suggests that attempting to analogize to cases with allegedly similar 
facts is not the most appropriate way to address questions of what 
constitutes a “regular and established place of business.”  
Further, while it is possible to distill some higher-level 
governing principles from the collection of pre-VE Holding cases, it is 
not clear that applying such principles in this context would yield any 
better results.  As noted previously, in general terms, in order to have 
a regular and established place of business, a corporation must have a 
continuous (although not necessarily fixed) presence in the district, 
must conduct regular, continuous business, and must exercise some 
control over that business.174  As demonstrated in the few fact patterns 
or models above, attempting to apply even this very broad test to the 
Uber model, the Telecommuting model, or the Web Services model 
would raise difficult questions that were likely never intended to be 
addressed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400. 
1. A Restrained Approach 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Internet Age is 
different enough from the world of the 1920s – 1980s that it is difficult 
to analogize directly between circumstances in the pre-VE Holding 
 
172 Indeed, the first time Congress appears to have considered the import of ATMs was in the 
2011 America Invents Act, when Congress included a provision creating an “ATM exemption 
for venue purposes,” dictating that “In an action for infringement under section 281 of title 35, 
United States Code, of a covered business method patent, an automated teller machine shall 
not be deemed to be a regular and established place of business for purposes of section 1400(b) 
. . . .”  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 
2011). 
173 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at  2484. 
174 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 737; Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc., 531 F.2d at 1387-
88. 
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business environment and the business environment today.  Put 
another way, while some methods of doing business have remained 
constant, and are easily subject to pre-VE Holding law, other ways of 
doing business are so novel and so new that it is hard to draw direct 
analogies or to say how cases should come out in light of that law.   
That said, this conclusion does not mean courts attempting to 
determine what constitutes a regular and established place of business 
should not look to pre-VE Holding law.  Now that TC Heartland has 
prevailed at the Supreme Court, courts will have to do exactly that, as 
this case law appears, once again, to be binding precedent.  And in 
many cases, applying pre-VE Holding law and analogizing to pre-VE 
Holding fact patterns is likely to achieve good results, and correctly 
determine what constitutes a regular and established place of business 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1400.  But what this Article has demonstrated is 
that, at least in some cases, applying pre-VE Holding law to the Internet 
Age and analogizing to pre-VE Holding fact patterns may not achieve 
good or correct results.  In those cases, where the methods of doing 
business are too new, too web-driven, or too incomparable to the 
methods of doing business of the 1920s–1980s, courts should take a 
restrained approach instead of blithely applying all pre-VE Holding 
law.  Put another way: when faced with these novel situations, courts 
should consider simply finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) was not 
intended to reach these unusual circumstances, and so there is no 
regular and established place of business in the district where Uber’s 
independent contractors pick up passengers, where employees 
telecommute seamlessly from home offices, or where a company 
leases time on Amazon’s servers.  28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is a special 
venue statute drafted by Congress; when faced with these sorts of fact 
patterns, courts should consider whether to hold off on analogizing to 
pre-VE Holding case law, and let Congress determine whether it 
wishes to amend § 1400(b) to address the Internet Age.  
V. CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, TC Heartland’s victory will likely have 
significant effects on how and where patent plaintiffs can bring 
infringement actions, and will almost certainly reduce substantially the 
importance of the Eastern District of Texas as a venue for patent 
litigation.  In this Article, we have examined how TC Heartland’s win 
will revitalize an old question—what constitutes a “regular and 
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established place of business” under 28 U.S.C. § 1400.  And we have 
specifically argued that TC Heartland’s win will raise concerns about 
courts potentially applying case law addressing obsolete or dated 
business structures and circumstances to the vastly different business 
structures of the Internet Age.  
  This said, when we began this Article, the Court had not yet 
issued an opinion in TC Heartland.  While, now that it has issued its 
opinion, it is clear that the specific issue of what constitutes a regular 
and established place of business under 28 U.S.C. § 1400 is, once 
again, relevant.  Had TC Heartland lost, then much of the discussion 
above would have obviously been less relevant to courts considering 
where venue lies for patent infringement actions.  But the argument we 
are making in this Article is not solely limited to the context of this 
case, or this dispute.  Indeed, even if TC Heartland had lost, our 
broader point would have remained the same: in an explosively 
changing world, courts today should at the very least be cautious when 
relying on, applying, or analogizing to cases decided in a vastly 
different time and context, and under factual scenarios that were not 
(or could not be) contemplated.  Lawyers and judges are certainly 
intellectually capable of analogizing across different historical periods, 
but doing so raises the question of whether such analogies are useful 
or meaningful except as intellectual exercises.  And the question that 
courts should consider in such cases is exactly when and whether 
engaging in this sort of analysis is truly the best way to reach correct 
judgments.   
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